Operation Northwoods: The Plan That Never Happened?

In 1962, the United States and Cuba were enemies.

Fidel Castro had taken control of Cuba in 1959. His government soon moved closer to the Soviet Union, America’s main Cold War rival.

Cuba is only about 90 miles from Florida.

Washington was worried.

American leaders had already tried to remove Castro from power. In 1961, the United States supported an invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles.

It failed.

The event became known as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Castro stayed in power.

But the United States did not give up.

Behind the scenes, American officials continued looking for ways to weaken or remove the Cuban government.

It was during this tense period that one of the most unusual documents in Cold War history was written.

It became known as Operation Northwoods.

What Was Operation Northwoods?

First, it is important to understand what Northwoods was and what it was not.

It was not an attack.

It was not a war.

It was a proposal.

On March 13, 1962, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

The title was:

“Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba.”

The question behind the document was straightforward:

How could the United States create a situation that would justify military action against Cuba?

The answer was disturbing.

The military proposed creating incidents that could make it appear that Cuba had attacked the United States.

The purpose was to build public and international support for American military intervention.

The document described these ideas as possible “pretexts” for intervention.

In simple terms:

Make Cuba look like the aggressor, then America could respond.

That was the basic idea behind Northwoods.

Why Was This Being Considered?

Northwoods did not appear out of nowhere.

After the Bay of Pigs failure, President John F. Kennedy’s administration continued searching for ways to bring down Castro.

One major effort was called Operation Mongoose, also known as the Cuban Project.

Mongoose was a secret campaign involving intelligence gathering, sabotage, propaganda, and other efforts to weaken the Castro government.

In February 1962, Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, who helped direct the Cuba operation, asked the Joint Chiefs for ideas that could provide a justification for military intervention.

The Joint Chiefs responded with Northwoods.

The proposal therefore came from a much larger campaign against Castro.

Inside the Northwoods Plan

The Northwoods memorandum is written in the dry language of military planning.

But when that language is translated into plain English, the ideas become much easier to understand.

The planners suggested creating a series of incidents and blaming them on Cuba.

The incidents could then be used to make Cuba appear increasingly dangerous.

The goal was to put the United States in what the document called the “apparent position” of suffering legitimate grievances at the hands of Cuba.

Here are some of the proposals.

1. Create Trouble at Guantánamo

The United States had a military base at Guantánamo Bay, inside Cuba.

The Northwoods planners discussed creating incidents around the base that would appear to come from Cuban forces.

The ideas included:

spreading rumors;
using friendly Cubans dressed as Cuban soldiers;
creating riots;
staging attacks;
setting fires;
exploding ammunition;
firing mortar shells toward the base;
sabotaging ships;
and creating the appearance of an attack from the sea.

The purpose was to make it appear that Cuban forces were attacking American personnel.

The United States could then respond.

To an outside observer, it could look like America was defending itself.

But the original incident would have been manufactured.

2. A Modern “Remember the Maine”

The planners also suggested something they called a “Remember the Maine” incident.

The reference was to the USS Maine, an American battleship that exploded in Havana Harbor in 1898.

The explosion helped create enormous public anger against Spain and became part of the political atmosphere surrounding the Spanish-American War.

Northwoods proposed creating a similar event.

One idea was to blow up an American ship in Guantánamo Bay and blame Cuba.

Another involved an unmanned vessel.

The planners understood that the public reaction would be important. They discussed the effect that reports of American casualties could have on public opinion.

The purpose was to create outrage that could help build support for military action.

3. Create Terror in American Cities

The proposal went beyond Cuba.

The document discussed creating the appearance of a Cuban-sponsored terror campaign in Miami, other Florida cities, and even Washington.

The planners discussed using Cuban refugees in some scenarios.

Ideas included attacks on Cuban refugees, bombings, and the release of documents that could appear to prove Cuban involvement.

Again, the goal was the same:

Make Americans believe that Castro’s government was attacking them.

4. Sink a Boat Carrying Refugees

Another proposal involved a boat carrying Cuban refugees toward Florida.

The document suggested that the boat could be sunk, either for real or as a simulated incident.

The disaster could then be blamed on Cuba.

The planners understood the emotional impact such an event could have.

A boat filled with people fleeing communism.

A deadly attack.

Cuba blamed.

American citizens outraged.

That reaction could then be used to build support for military intervention.

5. The Fake Airliner

One of the most elaborate ideas involved a civilian airplane.

The planners imagined using two aircraft.

One would be the real civilian aircraft.

The other would be made to look like it.

The passenger aircraft could secretly land, and the passengers could be removed.

The duplicate aircraft would then continue flying.

At the right moment, it would send a distress message claiming that Cuban fighter planes were attacking it.

The aircraft could then be destroyed remotely.

Radio stations would hear the distress call.

Search teams would find wreckage.

To the public, it could appear that Cuba had shot down an American civilian aircraft.

But the aircraft and the entire incident would have been part of the deception.

This is one of the most striking proposals in the Northwoods memorandum.

6. Make It Look Like Cuba Shot Down an American Military Plane

Another proposal involved an American military aircraft.

Several aircraft would fly near Cuba as part of what appeared to be a routine exercise.

One pilot would later report that Cuban MiG fighters had attacked him.

Instead of being killed, the pilot would secretly land at another American base.

The aircraft could be hidden.

At the same time, pieces of an aircraft could be dropped into the ocean.

Search teams could then find the wreckage.

The public would believe an American aircraft had been shot down.

Again, the purpose was to create evidence of a Cuban attack.

Why So Many Different Ideas?

This is an important detail.

Northwoods was not one simple order saying:

“Do this tomorrow.”

The memorandum described a collection of possible scenarios.

The Joint Chiefs presented them as a preliminary submission for planning purposes.

Different ideas could be considered, combined and developed into a larger operation.

The planners even discussed creating a series of incidents that might appear unrelated.

One incident would happen.

Then another.

Together, they could create the impression that Cuba was becoming more dangerous.

The ultimate goal was military intervention.

The Most Revealing Part

Perhaps the most revealing part of the document is also one of the simplest.

The planners said that if a credible rebellion against Castro could not be created, the United States might need to develop a Cuban provocation that could be used to justify military action.

That sentence gets to the heart of Northwoods.

The planners were not simply discussing how to respond to an attack.

They were discussing how to create a provocation that could justify a response.

What Was Happening in October 1962?

Now we come to another important document.

On October 4, 1962, the Special Group overseeing Operation Mongoose met to discuss the campaign against Castro.

The document is titled:

“Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962.”

It is sometimes confused with Northwoods.

It is not.

It is a separate document.

But it helps show what was happening in the larger Cuba operation at the time.

At the meeting, Attorney General Robert Kennedy expressed concern about the lack of progress in the Mongoose program and called for greater activity, particularly sabotage.

The meeting included senior officials involved in the Cuba campaign.

And the timing is remarkable.

The meeting took place on October 4.

Within days, the Cuban Missile Crisis would begin, leading the United States and the Soviet Union into one of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War.

Northwoods therefore belongs to a much larger story.

The United States was not simply watching Cuba.

It was actively trying to weaken Castro’s government while tensions with the Soviet Union were rising rapidly.

Was Northwoods Approved?

No.

This is perhaps the most important fact in the entire story.

Northwoods was never approved as an operation.

The document was a proposal for planning.

President Kennedy did not authorize the scenarios described in it.

There is no evidence that the proposed Northwoods operations were carried out.

That distinction must remain clear.

Northwoods is evidence that senior military officials considered these ideas.

It is not evidence that they actually put them into action.

A plan on paper is not the same thing as an operation in the real world.

What Happened to General Lemnitzer?

General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the Northwoods memorandum was sent to McNamara.

Later that year, his term as chairman ended.

General Maxwell Taylor succeeded him.

It is tempting to connect Lemnitzer’s departure directly to Northwoods.

But the available evidence does not establish that President Kennedy removed Lemnitzer because of the proposal.

There were broader military and political issues involved.

So the responsible way to tell the story is simply to give the timeline:

Lemnitzer signed the Northwoods memorandum. His term as chairman ended later in 1962. Taylor succeeded him.

Anything beyond that requires additional evidence.

How Did the Public Learn About Northwoods?

For decades, almost nobody outside government circles knew about the document.

It remained classified.

That changed in the 1990s.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, created by Congress to review and release records connected to the Kennedy assassination, examined large collections of government documents.

Among those records were documents concerning American policy toward Cuba.

The Northwoods memorandum eventually became public through the declassification process.

The National Security Archive later published the document online, making it available to a much wider audience.

A document once hidden in government files could now be read by anyone.

What Does Northwoods Prove?

This is where we need to be precise.

Northwoods proves that:

The memorandum existed.
Senior American military officials wrote it.
It was sent to the Secretary of Defense.
The planners considered manufactured incidents as possible justification for military intervention in Cuba.
The proposal included several elaborate scenarios.
The document was part of a broader effort against Castro.

But Northwoods does not prove that:

The plan was approved.
The proposed incidents were carried out.
The United States actually staged the events described in the memorandum.
Every idea discussed by the military became government policy.

Those distinctions matter.

It is possible to recognize how disturbing the document is without claiming more than the evidence shows.

Why Does Northwoods Matter?

More than sixty years later, why should anyone care about a Cold War document that was never put into action?

Because it gives us something unusual:

A look behind the curtain.

Governments make plans every day.

Most never become public.

Some are approved.

Some are rejected.

Some remain classified for decades.

Northwoods was rejected, but the document survived.

When it was eventually declassified, it gave the public a rare look at what senior American military officials were willing to consider during one of the Cold War’s most dangerous periods.

And there is a larger lesson.

The existence of a plan tells us what someone was willing to consider.

It does not automatically tell us what actually happened.

That distinction is easy to lose.

But it is one of the most important lessons of history.

The Bottom Line

Operation Northwoods was real.

The memorandum was real.

The people who wrote it were real.

The proposed scenarios were real.

But the operation itself never happened.

That is the story.

We do not need to exaggerate it.

We do not need to turn it into something it was not.

The historical record is already extraordinary enough.

In 1962, while the United States was trying to weaken and remove Fidel Castro’s government, senior American military leaders considered a series of manufactured incidents that could make Cuba appear responsible for attacks against Americans.

The purpose was to create a justification for military intervention.

The plan was not approved.

It was not carried out.

Decades later, the document became public.

That leaves us with an uncomfortable piece of American history.

Not a story about what America did.

A story about what some of its most powerful military leaders were willing to consider doing.